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Este artículo retoma la opinión, apuntada en el
pasado por varios autores pero actualmente olvida-
da, de que toûto tò … paidíon en Lisias 3.33 no se
refiere a Teodoto, el joven que motivó el enfrenta-
miento entre las partes del pleito, sino al esclavo
‚kólouqoj del orador. Las dificultades que suelen
señalarse a propósito de la condición cívica de
Teodoto se disipan si se adopta esta opinión.
This paper revives the view, advanced in the past
by several authorities but currently neglected, that
toûto … tò paidíon in Lysias 3.33 refers, not to
Theodotos, the young man over whom the parties
to the case had clashed, but to the speaker’s slave
‚kólouqoj. The problems usually perceived over
the civic status of Theodotos vanish if this view is
accepted.
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Lysias 3 (Against Simon) is the defence of an unnamed speaker charged
by Simon with premeditated wounding with intent to kill, four years after the
alleged events. The speaker and Simon were then both in love with one
Theodotos, who, according to the speaker, was a “Plataian youth” (§5).
Simon, so the speaker alleges, attempted to abduct Theodotos and was
injured in a general affray. In discussing the controversial question of the
civic status (and age) of Theodotos, the most recent commentary on Lysias
3, Carey 1989, focusses (pp. 87, 107) on the initial sentence of §33:
καÂ ¦πεβούλευον μ¥ν αÛτè, οàτω δ¥ μλθον •παράσκευος, òστε μήτε φίλους μήτε
οÆκέτας μήτε –λλον –νθρωπον παρακαλέσαι μηδένα, εÆ μ¬ τοØτό γε τÎ παιδίον, Ô
¦πικουρ−σαι μέν μοι οÛκ —ν ¦δύνατο, μηνØσαι δ¥ ÊκανÎν μν βασανιζόμενον, εÇ τι ¦γã
¦ξημάρτανον;
Carey, who, like the majority of commentators, takes τοØτο τÎ παιδίον to
refer to Theodotos, presents his conclusions with admirable concision: 
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1 Carey 1989 also concluded that, as a slave, Theodotos did not possess the legal capa-
city to contract out his erotic services (p. 90).
2 The obstacle to this view is, of course, the label “Plataian youth” (ΠλαταϊκοØ μειρα-
κίου, §5). In Lys. XXIII, the speaker, prosecuting one Pagkleon for allegedly having claimed
to be a “Plataian” when he was not, expresses doubts about Pagkleon’s adherence to a deme
and tribe (§§2-4). This implies that Pagkleon’s claim to be a “Plataian” was a claim to
Athenian citizenship in accordance with the grant of 427: cf. Kapparis 1995.
3 Bushala’s verdict was impugned by Thür 1977, pp. 19-22, esp. p. 22 n.43, less perhaps
for its own demerits than because of what Bushala wished to base on it. Thür also rejected the
alternative view of τÎ παιδίον expounded below. Carey 1989, p. 107 refers to Bushala’s
argument that a μειράκιον could be called a παιδίον, but does not take issue with him on the
slavery/freedom question.
At the time of the trial he [Theodotos] must have been at least eighteen years of age,
and yet the speaker is able to refer to him in §33 as παιδίον, ‘little boy’; so he must
have been of slight build … In 427 Plataia in Boiotia, a loyal ally of Athens, was
captured by the Spartans and ceased to exist as an independent state. Those Plataians
who escaped to Athens could claim Athenian citizenship, subject to individual scru-
tiny. We can be sure that Theodotos’ father had never received citizenship. In §§21-6
there is talk of a sexual contract between Theodotos and Simon; the existence of the
contract is denied, but there is no suggestion that it would be improper or illegal for
the boy to make such a contract, although an Athenian citizen who prostituted himself
lost his citizen rights. Furthermore, in §33 the possibility of putting Theodotos to the
torture is raised; no Athenian citizen could be tortured (Andok. I 43). It is indeed
unlikely even that non-citizens were tortured in Athens except where the safety of the
state was at risk. There is therefore good reason to accept the majority view that Theo-
dotos was a slave. (p. 87)1.
However Carey’s conclusion (shared by many of his predecessors) that
Theodotos was a slave has met recent resistance. Todd 2000, pp. 42-3 – also
taking τοØτο τÎ παιδίον as Theodotos – regarded Theodotos as a free Pla-
taian who had not received Athenian citizenship2, but whose civic status was
indeterminate. Todd did not confront the difficulty inherent in the notion of a
free alien, as he saw him, being tortured in an Athenian civil case. But this
difficulty was met head on by an earlier contributor to this debate, Bushala
1968. Like Todd, Bushala (pp. 64-6) contended that Theodotos was a free
alien not a slave, pointing particularly to his freedom of movement and to his
ability to enter into a contract for his erotic services. Bushala, who, like the
other scholars so far mentioned, believed that τοØτο ... τÎ παιδίον refers to
Theodotos, was intent on supporting another controversial opinion3, namely
that the Athenians tortured free aliens to obtain evidence in homicide cases.
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4 Theodotos’ (alleged) self-prostitution is not determinant either: the contract may have
been the malicious invention of Simon, it was unprovable anyhow, and Theodotos was
seemingly no longer involved in the case (below).
5 Blass 1868, p. 594 n.1 = 1887,  p. 586 n.3.
6 Grace 1973, p. 27 n.13; 1974, p. 42 n.21.
7 E.g. Fernández-Galiano 1953, p. 77 identified τÎ παιδίον as a slave, but without
arguments or bibliography; Carey 1989, p. 107 noted only that Blass suggested that τÎ
παιδίον was “someone else”.
In the course of arguing this position he rejected (pp. 66-8) an alternative
view of τÎ παιδίον which some earlier commentators had espoused. The
alternative view does not help us to decide whether Theodotos had Athenian
citizen rights or was a metic4, but it eliminates from Lysias 3 any support for
the notion that a free individual could have been tortured in connection with
the case being tried there (even if a murder had actually taken place); and it
also eliminates the supposed evidence for Theodotos' servile condition.
The alternative view is that τοØτο ... τÎ παιδίον has nothing to do with
Theodotos, but refers to the speaker’s slave “follower” (•κόλουθος). The
earliest version of it known to me dates from 1868, when Blass in the first
edition of his ground-breaking text-book5 commented: «mit τοØτο τÎ παιδίον
3,33 ist Theodotos gar nicht gemeint». Dobree 1874, p. 194, followed up
with a more explicit proposal about «τÎ παιδίον: non esse videtur Theodotus;
sed oratoris •κόλουθος». Neither scholar advanced arguments. The approach
of Emily Grace6 (citing Blass and Dobree) was similar. She did add two
skeleton arguments: in Lysias 3 Theodotos is called μειράκιον and νεα-
νίσκος, but never παιδίον; and Theodotos did participate in the violent con-
frontation with Simon’s friends, which is inconsistent with the παιδίον’s
stated inability to help the speaker. But she did not answer the objections of
Bushala 1968 – discussed below. Admittedly no incontrovertible proof can
be offered for either view: the evidence, including the linguistic evidence
(below), is just too evenly weighted. But since a number of legal problems
vanish if Theodotos is not τοØτο ... τÎ παιδίον, and since the case for (and,
with the exception of Bushala 1968, the case against) this proposition has to
date been made, or recorded, only in footnotes or casual asides7, it may be
worthwhile to revive and expand upon it in the hope that future commen-
tators on Lysias 3 and on these problems may take more account of it.
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8 §§4, 5, 6, 10, 12 (twice), 15, 18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 37 (twice).
9 §§10, 17 (twice).
10 Bushala also notes (p. 67) that «at the time of his death, one of Socrates’ παιδία was a
μειράκιον», citing Plat., Phaedo 116b and Apol. 34c-d. In such a case παιδία refers to
filiation, not age.
11 There are more general references to “lads” at Theaet. 146b and 168e.
In Lysias 3 Theodotos is called μειράκιον no less than seventeen times8,
and νεανίσκος three times9. The point at issue is whether, in the global con-
text of these twenty references, it is reasonable to understand the speaker’s
single reference to τÎ παιδίον as a reference to the same individual. Bushala
cites one or two passages where παιδίον is applied to an older child10, which
is unsurprising. But his best argument for taking τÎ παιδίον as Theodotos
relies on Plato’s references to Theaitetos in the dialogue of that name (p. 67).
There Theaitetos is called a μειράκιον three times, and he is addressed many
times by Socrates as a παÃς. In addition Protagoras, Socrates’ target, is
imagined as referring to Theaitetos once as a παιδίον. However the referen-
ces to Theaitetos as a μειράκιον are made by three different speakers in the
introductory section of the dialogue (142c, Eukleides; 143e: Theodoros;
144c: Socrates) before Theaitetos enters it in person11. The more encouraging
and friendly ì παÃ appears only in Socrates’ direct addresses to Theaitetos,
which is easy and natural. The use of παιδίον to refer to Theaitetos comes
later in the dialogue when Protagoras is imagined as making the exaggerated
assertion that Socrates has bamboozled the “child” Theaitetos (166a). In
contrast Lysias 3 has a single speaker who refers twenty times to Theodotos
as μειράκιον and νεανίσκος, and who is supposed to point out or to mention
Theodotos once as “this παιδίον”. So what happens in Plato’s Theaetetus is
not closely parallel to what happens in Lysias 3.
Carrying his argument forward Bushala rightly claimed that παιδίον is
used in Lysias 3.33 «in order to emphasize his [the speaker’s] point that he
could expect little or no help at all from ‘the child’» (p. 67). But the question
then arises whether such helplessness is sensibly attributable to Theodotos?
As Grace noted, Theodotos does put up resistance in the “battle” between the
two groups, and so is clearly capable of some exertion. Theodotos resists on
his own behalf, not that of the speaker, but he is not a complete weakling.
Moreover, if Theodotos was already a “youth” four years earlier when the
events under dispute took place, might it not have been ludicrous and
therefore counter-productive for the speaker to refer to him as a “boy”
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ºγούμενος δεινÎν εÉναι, εÆ –ρα περÂ παιδικäν ¦φιλονικήσαμεν ºμεÃς πρÎς •λλήλους,
τούτου ªνεκα ¦ξελάσαι τινς ζητ−σαι ¦κ τ−ς πατρίδος. (§ 40) –– παιδικäν X: παίδων rell.;
δεινÎν —ν εÇη, εÆ Óσοι ¦κ μέθης καÂ φιλονικίας ´ ¦κ παιδικäν ´ ¦κ λοιδορίας ´ περÂ ©ταίρας
μαχόμενοι ªλκος §λαβον κτλ. (§ 43) παιδικäν X: παιδιäν C. Although editors sometimes
prefer to read παίδων (40) or παιδιäν (43), the terminus technicus for ‘boyfriend’ is παιδικά
and παιδικäν is the reading of the most reliable MS. 
13 On another implication of this, see below.
14 Carey 1989, p. 92 believes that the affair continues, and that Theodotos is still in
contact with the speaker – but see below.
during the trial? It is, of course, irrelevant that the speaker refers twice to
“boy-friend(s)” in general as παιδικά since παιδικά is not synonymous with
παιδίον12. Another question worth asking is whether Theodotos was
constantly in the speaker’s company during the events which led to the trial.
If he was, then it might appear more likely that he is the παιδίον. But in fact
he seems not to have been constantly with the speaker. Lysias 3.12 has the
pair leaving Lysimachus’ house together before being attacked and taking
flight separately (3.12-13), while 3.17-18 has them reunited, again under
attack together. That there was a definite interval in which they were not
together is implied by the speaker’s description of himself as “walking
alone” (μόνος βαδίζων, §17)13. 
Next the possible linguistic implications of the phrase τοØτό … τÎ παι-
δίον: no deictic is attached to any of the references to Theodotos as μειρά-
κιον or νεανίσκος, and the speech contains no indication that Theodotos was
there in court. If (although this is a moot point: see below) the deictic τοØτό
attached to τÎ παιδίον implies the presence of τÎ παιδίον in court14, and if τÎ
παιδίον is Theodotos, then surely he would have provided testimony, or at
least have been offered as a witness, whatever his status. But there is not the
slightest hint in Lysias 3 that Theodotos was a witness. On the other hand
the identification of τοØτό ... τÎ παιδίον as the speaker’s “follower” slave ge-
nerates no such difficulties. He would have been present during the events
which led to the trial, and he would also have been present in court. In either
context, he would have been so insignificant as to be worth mentioning only
in a reductio ad absurdum such as the speakers’ reference to τοØτό … τÎ
παιδίον, since qua slave he was a “non-person”. Indeed it would have been
his servile status which allowed the speaker to represent himself as “walking
alone” (§17) in the mid-part of the conflict, even though his slave-follower
would still have been with him. Athenians regularly went about with one or
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15 E.g. Aristoph. Eccl. 593; Plut. Phoc. 19.3; Dio Chrys. 40.2; cf. also Carey and Reid
(1985) 86-7. At Lys. 32.16 the turning out of orphans without a single •κόλουθος is regarded
as a disgrace: cf. Carey (1989) 218.
16 Carey 1989, pp. 86-7.
17 Slaves could, of course, assist their masters in brawls: when the speaker of Lys. 3
asserts that, had he intended Simon harm, he would have gone accompanied by (slave)
retainers (§33), he clearly did not imagine them as simply standing by.
18 Cf. LSJ s.v. II. Bushala 1967, p. 67 claims that the sense ‘slave’ is «extremely rare».
This is not so: the reason why it does not occur in the authors listed by him (p. 67 n.21) is that
in those authors no-one refers to his own slave in this everyday fashion.
more “follower” slaves in attendance. It was such a commonplace practice
that being accompanied by only one such slave could be taken as a sign of
poverty15, although the speaker in the present case, who was obviously a
man of substance16, is stressing something different, namely his lack of
aggressiveness and premeditation. The speaker’s slave •κόλουθος was pre-
sumably “incapable of assisting” the speaker because he was very young or
very slight, something to which the speaker calls attention by pointing at
him17. But a slave •κόλουθος would nevertheless have been “able to give
evidence under torture” against the speaker because, as a slave, he could on-
ly give evidence in this way. Although Bushala, p. 67, makes reasonable ge-
neral statements about the meanings of παιδίον, he fails to consider the pos-
sibility that παιδίον may appear in Lysias 33 in a specialized sense – as used
by a master of his own slave (or said by others with privileged access to a
slave, such as visitors or guests) – like Latin puer18. In this case the phrase εÆ
μ¬ τοØτό γε τÎ παιδίον could arguably mean: “except for my slave here”.
I add “arguably” because, as noted above, the alternative view of τοØτό
τÎ … παιδίον as the speaker’s •κόλουθος slave is as incapable of incontro-
vertible proof as is the view that he is Theodotos. This is mainly due to the
attested usage of the phrase τοØτό τÎ παιδίον. First, although common
enough, it never elsewhere, as far as I can determine, refers to “my slave”,
although there is no linguistic reason why (in the mouth of the slave’s
master) it could not do so. Second, and this is where the real ambivalence
lies, the phrase can refer either to someone physically present, or to someone
not present but the subject of conversation. This can be illustrated rapidly
from the only four examples in Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe:
θ−λυ μν τοØτο τÎ παιδίον, καÂ παρέκειτο καÂ τούτå γνωρίσματαq μίτρα διάχρυσος,
ßποδήματα ¦πίχρυσα, περισκελίδες χρυσαÃ. (1.5.3, Chloe is spoken of in a narrative).
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καÂ χαÃρε μόνος •νθρώπων ¦ν γήρ‘ θεασάμενος τοØτο τÎ παιδίον. (2.5.5, Eros is
present and refers to himself(!)).
îμην ÊκανÎν εÉναι τÎ γένος, καÂ γενόμενον ¦πÂ πσι τοØτο τÎ παιδίον ¦ξέθηκα, οÛ
γνωρίσματα ταØτα συνεκθείς, •λλ’ ¦ντάφια. (4.24.1, Daphnis is spoken of in a
narrative, but is also present).
•νεβόησεν Ò Διονυσοφάνης μεÃζον τοØ Μεγακλέους καÂ •ναπηδήσας εÆσάγει Χλόην
πάνυ καλäς κεκοσμημένην καÂ λέγειq τοØτο τÎ παιδίον ¦ξέθηκαςq ταύτην σοÂ τ¬ν
παρθένον Ðϊς προνοί‘ θεäν •νέθρεψεν, ñς αÈξ Δάφνιν ¦μοί. (4.36.1, Chloe is present
and is referred to).
The choice, then, in Lysias 3.33 lies between taking τοØτό τÎ παιδίον
either of Theodotos, who has just been spoken of (as το μειράκιον) in §32,
but is seemingly not in court, or of the speaker’s slave attendant, present in
court. The first view creates a legal problem, the second does not. Identi-
fication of the παιδίον as a slave •κόλουθος would offer a further hint about
the circumstances of Simon’s prosecution. If Theodotos is not in court – as
he certainly does not give evidence – he has either left Athens or died, and
his relationship with the defendant is over. Might this explain the four year
delay between the events and trial? Was Simon waiting for Theodotos, who
(whether as a citizen or metic witness) could easily have refuted his charge,
to be out of the way before he initiated the case?
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ADDENDVM
In the interval since this paper was submitted for publication there has appeared K.
Nikau, «Zur Epiphanie des Eros im Hirtenroman des Longos», Hermes 130, 2002,
pp. 176-91, with (pp. 190-1) a useful Anhang: «paîj und paidíon bei Longos».
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